Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire

G.E. Moore famously observed that to say, ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ or ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ (1944, 204). would be ‘absurd’. Moore-paradoxical omissive or commissive beliefs of the forms p & I do not believe that p and p &...

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Main Author: WILLIAMS, John N.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2007
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/203
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soss_research-12022018-05-04T00:45:21Z Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire WILLIAMS, John N. G.E. Moore famously observed that to say, ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ or ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ (1944, 204). would be ‘absurd’. Moore-paradoxical omissive or commissive beliefs of the forms p & I do not believe that p and p & I believe that not-p. are also absurd, although their contents are possible truths. Can there be ‘Moorean desires’, namely desires of the forms I desire both that (p & I do not desire that p) and I desire both that (p & I desire that not-p) that are ‘Moore-paradoxical’, in the sense that they are absurd roughly in the way Moore-paradoxical beliefs are absurd? I argue that the most promising approach to a yes is a normative account of doxastic Moore-paradoxicality that parallels a normative account of Moorean desire. It turns out that this won’t work, not because there are no norms of desire, but because the norms required are ones we should reject. Unlike Moorean belief, which is always irrational, Moorean desire, although often odd, is sometimes sensible. An interesting lesson to be learned along the way—and an important one for functionalism—is that the logic of desire differs from that of both belief and conscious belief. 2007-07-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/203 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Philosophy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Philosophy
spellingShingle Philosophy
WILLIAMS, John N.
Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire
description G.E. Moore famously observed that to say, ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ or ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ (1944, 204). would be ‘absurd’. Moore-paradoxical omissive or commissive beliefs of the forms p & I do not believe that p and p & I believe that not-p. are also absurd, although their contents are possible truths. Can there be ‘Moorean desires’, namely desires of the forms I desire both that (p & I do not desire that p) and I desire both that (p & I desire that not-p) that are ‘Moore-paradoxical’, in the sense that they are absurd roughly in the way Moore-paradoxical beliefs are absurd? I argue that the most promising approach to a yes is a normative account of doxastic Moore-paradoxicality that parallels a normative account of Moorean desire. It turns out that this won’t work, not because there are no norms of desire, but because the norms required are ones we should reject. Unlike Moorean belief, which is always irrational, Moorean desire, although often odd, is sometimes sensible. An interesting lesson to be learned along the way—and an important one for functionalism—is that the logic of desire differs from that of both belief and conscious belief.
format text
author WILLIAMS, John N.
author_facet WILLIAMS, John N.
author_sort WILLIAMS, John N.
title Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire
title_short Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire
title_full Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire
title_fullStr Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire
title_full_unstemmed Why there is no Moore's paradox of desire
title_sort why there is no moore's paradox of desire
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2007
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/203
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