Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief

In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epis...

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Main Author: WILLIAMS, John N.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/964
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/2219/viewcontent/MooresParadoxDefectiveInterpretationJustifiedBelief_2010.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soss_research-22192017-04-13T05:38:08Z Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief WILLIAMS, John N. In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective-interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore-paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches. 2010-09-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/964 info:doi/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/2219/viewcontent/MooresParadoxDefectiveInterpretationJustifiedBelief_2010.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Moore paradox assertion belief irrationality justification speech-acts consciousness Philosophy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Moore
paradox
assertion
belief
irrationality
justification
speech-acts
consciousness
Philosophy
spellingShingle Moore
paradox
assertion
belief
irrationality
justification
speech-acts
consciousness
Philosophy
WILLIAMS, John N.
Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
description In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective-interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore-paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches.
format text
author WILLIAMS, John N.
author_facet WILLIAMS, John N.
author_sort WILLIAMS, John N.
title Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
title_short Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
title_full Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
title_fullStr Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
title_full_unstemmed Moore's Paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
title_sort moore's paradox, defective interpretation, justified belief and conscious belief
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2010
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/964
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/2219/viewcontent/MooresParadoxDefectiveInterpretationJustifiedBelief_2010.pdf
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