The Completeness of the Pragmatic Solution to Moore's Paradox in Belief: A Reply to Chan

• Main Author: WILLIAMS, John N.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
• Subjects: G.E. Moore; Moore’s paradox; Self-falsification; Self-refutation; Circularity; Explanation; Belief; Absurdity; Irrationality; First-person; First-person/second-person asymmetry; De se; De se/non-de se asymmetry; Asymmetry; Philosophy
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1003; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/2259/viewcontent/auto_convert.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy CHAN calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to th...