Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox
John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks th...
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Main Author: | WILLIAMS, John N. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1385 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/2641/viewcontent/WilliamsJ2013TheoriaEliminativismDialethismMooresPreprint.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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