Not knowing you know: A new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge
Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection...
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2483 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3740/viewcontent/NotKnowingYouKnow_2015_afv.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these. |
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