Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important incontemporary moral theory. Yet providing an adequate formal account of it hasproven to be difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction,one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts....

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Main Author: HAMMERTON, Matthew
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2504
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3761/viewcontent/Distinguishing_Agent_Relativity_from_Agent_Neutrality.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soss_research-37612018-06-29T06:15:46Z Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality HAMMERTON, Matthew The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important incontemporary moral theory. Yet providing an adequate formal account of it hasproven to be difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction,one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on aninfluential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I arguethat their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two seriousobjections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insightsof McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections. 2018-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2504 info:doi/10.1080/00048402.2018.1477166 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3761/viewcontent/Distinguishing_Agent_Relativity_from_Agent_Neutrality.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University agent-neutral agent-relative moral rules ensuring maximizing Sociology Theory and Philosophy
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic agent-neutral
agent-relative
moral rules
ensuring
maximizing
Sociology
Theory and Philosophy
spellingShingle agent-neutral
agent-relative
moral rules
ensuring
maximizing
Sociology
Theory and Philosophy
HAMMERTON, Matthew
Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
description The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important incontemporary moral theory. Yet providing an adequate formal account of it hasproven to be difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction,one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on aninfluential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I arguethat their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two seriousobjections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insightsof McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections.
format text
author HAMMERTON, Matthew
author_facet HAMMERTON, Matthew
author_sort HAMMERTON, Matthew
title Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
title_short Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
title_full Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
title_fullStr Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
title_full_unstemmed Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
title_sort distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2018
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2504
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3761/viewcontent/Distinguishing_Agent_Relativity_from_Agent_Neutrality.pdf
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