Agents, principals, or something in between? Bureaucrats and policy control in Thailand

• Main Author: RICKS, Jacob
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
• Subjects: Politician-bureaucrat Relations; Agency Theory; Policy-making; Bureaucratic Politics; Thailand; Asian Studies; Political Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2527; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3784/viewcontent/2018_01_17_JEAS_AgentsPrincipals_ForSharing.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

In the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups,observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats,though, remained influential even during the period of 1992-2006, when electedpoliticians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement inpolitics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories ofpolitician-bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal-agentframeworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three differenthypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity andcontrol over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politiciansincreasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, andto a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequentlyengaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expandingtheir independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal-agentmodel overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear indeveloping countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such,theories of the politician-bureaucrat relationship in developing states need tobetter account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise autonomyand political influence.