Being Chinese again: Learning Mandarin in Post-Suharto Indonesia
For thirty-two years under former President Suharto’s New Order regime (from 1966-1998), the teaching of Chinese languages in schools was banned in Indonesia. During this period of total assimilation, public displays of Chinese characters were prohibited along with other forms of Chinese cultural ex...
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2720 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/3977/viewcontent/Being_Chinese_Again_2016_afv.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Summary: | For thirty-two years under former President Suharto’s New Order regime (from 1966-1998), the teaching of Chinese languages in schools was banned in Indonesia. During this period of total assimilation, public displays of Chinese characters were prohibited along with other forms of Chinese cultural expressions, allegedly for the sake of national unity. From 1966-69, hundreds of Chinese medium schools and Chinese language press were closed in Chinese settlements throughout the archipelago and the formal teaching of Chinese languages in Indonesia effectively ceased. As a result, the majority of contemporary Chinese Indonesians no longer have the ability to speak, let alone write in Chinese. As has been extensively documented, the situation only changed when, after months of economic crisis, political instability and student protests demanding the resignation of President Suharto, the chaos culminated in large-scale lootings,destruction of properties and rape of ethnic Chinese women between 12 and 14 May 1998 in Jakarta, Solo and other major cities (see Hoon, 2007; Purdey, 2006). Soon after, the New Order regime collapsed and a new era of reform (reformasi) began, with promises of civil society, democracy, civil liberties and justice. The post-Suharto socio-political atmosphere could not be more different for the ethnic Chinese whereby almost immediately, subsequent reformasi governments abolished almost all assimilationist policies, ushering in a ‘revival’ of Chinese identity (see Hoon, 2008; Setijadi, 2013). Since 1998, there has been a steady increase in the number of Chinese language courses and programs at Indonesian schools and universities,particularly in areas with large ethnic Chinese populations. Indeed,after three decades of assimilation, many Chinese parents – the majority ofwhom do not speak Chinese themselves – want their children learn to Chinese in order to ‘reconnect’ to a ‘lost’ Chinese identity. At a more pragmatic level, they are also deeply aware of the potential economic advantages of knowing Mandarin for the purposes of their children’s future career advancement, trade and guanxi with rapidly rising China. This pragmatism is reflected in the overwhelming popularity of Mandarin (particularly the standardised Putonghua variety used as the national language in China) as the language to learn and not regional dialects such as Teochew, Hakka or Hokkien originally spoken by the majority of Chinese migrants in the Indonesian archipelago. The youth themselves seem to embrace learning Mandarin with many increasingly engaging in code-switching between English, Mandarin and Indonesian in social interactions. In addition, the ability to speak or at least understand Mandarin also enable young Chinese Indonesians to further imagine themselves as part of a modern pan-Chinese youth identity they see in transnational Mandarin and Cantonese films, TV series and pop culture.Looking at all these trends, the ability to speak Chinese (particularly Mandarin) appears to be an important part in the construction of Chinese identities in the post-Suharto era. However, thus far, little is known about the linguistic practices and beliefs of contemporary Chinese Indonesians. Furthermore, considering that only fifteen years ago, Chinese languages and culture were banned, questions also need to be asked regarding how the ‘return’ of Chinese languages in public are perceived by Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians. Using ethnographic interviews with twenty-five young Chinese Indonesians[1] ages eighteen to thirty five from both genders conducted in Jakarta from 2008-2012, this chapter examines how young post-Suharto Chinese view their ethnic identity and belonging in relation to their ability (or inability) to speak Chinese. This chapter also discusses the tensions between competing ideologies on ethnicity,nationalism and culture as embodied in the daily negotiations of which language(s) to speak and when. |
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