Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula

The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disag...

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Main Authors: KIM, Inwook, PARK, Soul
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2751
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4008/viewcontent/Deterrence_under_nuclear_asymmetry.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soss_research-40082019-01-10T07:08:59Z Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula KIM, Inwook PARK, Soul The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the US extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability. 2019-04-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2751 info:doi/10.1080/13523260.2018.1558750 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4008/viewcontent/Deterrence_under_nuclear_asymmetry.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Security dilemma ballistic missile defense (BMD) terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) extended deterrence North Korea Asian Studies International Relations Military, War, and Peace
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Security dilemma
ballistic missile defense (BMD)
terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD)
extended deterrence
North Korea
Asian Studies
International Relations
Military, War, and Peace
spellingShingle Security dilemma
ballistic missile defense (BMD)
terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD)
extended deterrence
North Korea
Asian Studies
International Relations
Military, War, and Peace
KIM, Inwook
PARK, Soul
Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
description The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the US extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability.
format text
author KIM, Inwook
PARK, Soul
author_facet KIM, Inwook
PARK, Soul
author_sort KIM, Inwook
title Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
title_short Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
title_full Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
title_fullStr Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
title_full_unstemmed Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
title_sort deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: thaad and the prospects for missile defense on the korean peninsula
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2019
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2751
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4008/viewcontent/Deterrence_under_nuclear_asymmetry.pdf
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