Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula
The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disag...
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sg-smu-ink.soss_research-40082019-01-10T07:08:59Z Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula KIM, Inwook PARK, Soul The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the US extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability. 2019-04-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2751 info:doi/10.1080/13523260.2018.1558750 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4008/viewcontent/Deterrence_under_nuclear_asymmetry.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Security dilemma ballistic missile defense (BMD) terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) extended deterrence North Korea Asian Studies International Relations Military, War, and Peace |
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Security dilemma ballistic missile defense (BMD) terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) extended deterrence North Korea Asian Studies International Relations Military, War, and Peace KIM, Inwook PARK, Soul Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula |
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The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the US extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability. |
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text |
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KIM, Inwook PARK, Soul |
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KIM, Inwook PARK, Soul |
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KIM, Inwook |
title |
Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula |
title_short |
Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula |
title_full |
Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula |
title_fullStr |
Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula |
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Deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean peninsula |
title_sort |
deterrence under nuclear asymmetry: thaad and the prospects for missile defense on the korean peninsula |
publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
publishDate |
2019 |
url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2751 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4008/viewcontent/Deterrence_under_nuclear_asymmetry.pdf |
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1770574515121684480 |