Anti-Chinese sentiments and the ‘Return’ of the Pribumi discourse

• Main Author: SETIJADI, Charlotte
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
• Subjects: Indonesia; Chinese Indonesians; nativist politics; identity politics; Asian Studies; Sociology of Culture
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2965
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Chinese Indonesians have received considerable publicattention in recent times, mostly because of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorialelection and blasphemy scandal involving ethnic Chinese and Christian formerJakarta governor Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama. A popular governor with consistently high approvalratings, Ahok was widely tipped to win the Jakarta election. This was until thenow infamous blasphemy case over public comments Ahok had made in lateSeptember 2016 that allegedly insulted the Al-Maidah 51 verse of the Qur’an andulama (Islamic scholars). During the incident, Ahok urged Muslim voters innorthern Jakarta’s Thousand Islands district to make up their own minds and notbe influenced by those who claim that it would be sinful to elect a non-Muslimleader like him. Within weeks, a seriesof mass protests organized by hard-line Islamist groups such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’Front or FPI) that involved hundreds of thousands of angry Muslim protestersfrom all over Indonesia took place in central Jakarta. All of them called forAhok to be prosecuted for blasphemy, or even be put to death. What started as a religious issue soon also became arace and class issue. Very quickly, the angry chants on the streets took ahateful and racist tone against Ahok and the ethnic Chinese as a group. During the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial campaign whenAhok ran as now-president Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s deputy, some fringe localMuslim pribumi (indigenous) groupshad taken issue over Ahok’s Chinese ethnicity. However, these anti-Chinesesentiments were not regarded to be a big problem, and the public was generallysupportive of Ahok who was seen to be a meritocratic, anti-corruption maverick.In 2017, the situation was very different.Following the first mass demonstration on 4 November2016, groups of protesters went to the exclusive north Jakarta residentialestate where Ahok and his family lived in order to continue their protest. Themajority of the residents in that residential estate were affluent ethnicChinese, and the protesters’ threats to riot and torch houses in anger echoedthe horrors of the May 1998 riots. The protesters eventually left without muchdrama, but anti-Chinese rhetoric in the months that followed intensified,particularly on social media. For instance, rumours that Ahok’s political rise wasfinanced and engineered by Chinese Indonesian business tycoons as a way to alsoconquer the political sphere and influence close ally president Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodowere abundant. Another claimed that Ahok’s controversial Jakarta cove landreclamation project was actually intended to eventually house 10 million newmigrants from China. The rise of anti-Chinese narratives seen throughoutthe Jakarta election and Ahok blasphemy case has prompted questions aboutwhether old stereotypes and negative prejudices against the ethnic Chinese havepersisted despite almost two decades of policy and societal reforms. Was theJakarta election an isolated moment, or has there been a sustained rise inanti-Chinese discourse and ethno-nationalist rhetoric since 2017?In this paper, I investigate the ostensible increasein anti-Chinese rhetoric, as well as the re-entry of the term ‘pribum’ into political and publicdiscourse. I argue that anti-Chinese sentiments never actually went away fromthe Indonesian national psyche, despite of post-Suharto reforms. As such, theirbelonging in the Indonesian nation has continued to be contentious in nature. Inmy discussions, I include analysis of survey data on the pribumi public’s perception of the ethnic Chinese obtained from theIndonesian National Survey Project (INSP) conducted by ISEAS-Yusof IshakInstitute in May 2017 that I was a part of during my time as a Visiting Fellowat the Institute. I conclude by discussing the potential implications ofincreased xenophobia and ethno-nationalism for the upcoming 2019 presidentialand legislative elections.