Noncompliance with safety guidelines as a free-riding strategy: An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic
Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the bene...
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Main Authors: | YONG, Jose C., CHOY, Bryan K. C. |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2021
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3315 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/4572/viewcontent/fpsyg_12_646892.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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