The imaginary and epistemology of disaster preparedness: The case of Japan's nuclear safety failure

The Fukushima nuclear disaster was profoundly a man-made one, resulting from the organiza-tional failure of nuclear emergency preparedness. To fully understand the cause of this disaster, I propose to extend an organizational perspective on disasters into a macro-institutional perspec-tive on disast...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: SAITO, Hiro
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3788
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5046/viewcontent/S0304422X2100084X_pvoa_cc_by_nc_nd.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
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Summary:The Fukushima nuclear disaster was profoundly a man-made one, resulting from the organiza-tional failure of nuclear emergency preparedness. To fully understand the cause of this disaster, I propose to extend an organizational perspective on disasters into a macro-institutional perspec-tive on disaster preparedness. To this end, I borrow from science and technology studies the concepts of "sociotechnical imaginary" and "civic epistemology" to probe the deepest layers of meaning-making constitutive of disaster preparedness. I then apply these concepts to the history of nuclear energy in postwar Japan that was centered on the developmental state pursuing in-dustrial transformation. Specifically, I illustrate how the "pacifist imaginary" emphasized positive contributions of "the peaceful use of nuclear energy," legitimating a priori the promotion of nu-clear power as a means of economic development; and how the "technocratic epistemology" invoked the superior competencies of state bureaucrats and expert advisers, legitimating post hoc their disregard for the possibility of a severe accident. The imaginary and epistemology thus enabled the developmental state to pursue pro-nuclear policy by securing acquiescence from the majority of citizens and discrediting the minority of antinuclear activists - until the earthquake and tsunami exposed the preparedness failure in March 2011.