When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines

Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concur...

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Main Authors: DULAY, Dean C., GO, Laurence
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3801
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5059/viewcontent/dulay_go_2021_when_running_for_office_runs_in_the_family_horizontal_dynasties_policy_and_development_in_the_philippines.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soss_research-50592023-10-25T02:13:58Z When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines DULAY, Dean C. GO, Laurence Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent’s policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Using a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher economic growth economic growth or lower poverty. 2022-03-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3801 info:doi/10.1177/00104140211024292 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5059/viewcontent/dulay_go_2021_when_running_for_office_runs_in_the_family_horizontal_dynasties_policy_and_development_in_the_philippines.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University political dynasties include veto players economic development political parties regression discontinuity design the Philippines Asian Studies Leadership Studies Political Science
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic political dynasties
include veto players
economic development
political parties
regression discontinuity design
the Philippines
Asian Studies
Leadership Studies
Political Science
spellingShingle political dynasties
include veto players
economic development
political parties
regression discontinuity design
the Philippines
Asian Studies
Leadership Studies
Political Science
DULAY, Dean C.
GO, Laurence
When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
description Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent’s policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Using a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher economic growth economic growth or lower poverty.
format text
author DULAY, Dean C.
GO, Laurence
author_facet DULAY, Dean C.
GO, Laurence
author_sort DULAY, Dean C.
title When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
title_short When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
title_full When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
title_fullStr When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
title_full_unstemmed When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
title_sort when running for office runs in the family: horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the philippines
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2022
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3801
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5059/viewcontent/dulay_go_2021_when_running_for_office_runs_in_the_family_horizontal_dynasties_policy_and_development_in_the_philippines.pdf
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