When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines
Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concur...
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2022
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sg-smu-ink.soss_research-50592023-10-25T02:13:58Z When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines DULAY, Dean C. GO, Laurence Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent’s policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Using a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher economic growth economic growth or lower poverty. 2022-03-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3801 info:doi/10.1177/00104140211024292 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5059/viewcontent/dulay_go_2021_when_running_for_office_runs_in_the_family_horizontal_dynasties_policy_and_development_in_the_philippines.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University political dynasties include veto players economic development political parties regression discontinuity design the Philippines Asian Studies Leadership Studies Political Science |
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political dynasties include veto players economic development political parties regression discontinuity design the Philippines Asian Studies Leadership Studies Political Science DULAY, Dean C. GO, Laurence When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines |
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Political dynasties exist in practically every type of democracy, but take different forms in different places. Yet the types of dynastic structures have remained unexplored. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from the same political family holding different political offices concurrently—affect policymaking by replacing potential political rivals, who may oppose an incumbent’s policy choices, with a member of the family. But in developing countries, the policy change that accrues from dynastic status may not lead to higher levels of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Using a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of government spending, (ii) direct institutional constraints are the mechanism that drives this core result, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher economic growth economic growth or lower poverty. |
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DULAY, Dean C. GO, Laurence |
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DULAY, Dean C. GO, Laurence |
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DULAY, Dean C. |
title |
When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines |
title_short |
When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines |
title_full |
When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines |
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When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines |
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When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines |
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when running for office runs in the family: horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the philippines |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2022 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3801 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5059/viewcontent/dulay_go_2021_when_running_for_office_runs_in_the_family_horizontal_dynasties_policy_and_development_in_the_philippines.pdf |
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