District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties

Duverger's propositions concerning the psychologicaland mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously beenexamined mainly through the lens of district magnitude,comparing the properties of single-member district pluralityelections with those of multimember proportional representati...

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Main Author: BENOIT, Kenneth
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2001
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4005
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5263/viewcontent/benoit_2001_ejpr_av.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.soss_research-52632024-09-09T07:19:14Z District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties BENOIT, Kenneth Duverger's propositions concerning the psychologicaland mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously beenexamined mainly through the lens of district magnitude,comparing the properties of single-member district pluralityelections with those of multimember proportional representationelections. The empirical consequences of multi-member plurality(MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention.Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the numberand concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether theallocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test thistheory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where districtmagnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe ofpolitical parties is held constant, applying regression analysis todata from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. Theresults indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula hasthe potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerianconsequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis ofmulti-member plurality elections from the local election datasetreveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry mayincrease with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting importantdirections for future investigation of MMP rules. 2001-03-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4005 info:doi/10.1023/A:1011067724688 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5263/viewcontent/benoit_2001_ejpr_av.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School of Social Sciences eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Eastern European Studies Political Science
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Eastern European Studies
Political Science
spellingShingle Eastern European Studies
Political Science
BENOIT, Kenneth
District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
description Duverger's propositions concerning the psychologicaland mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously beenexamined mainly through the lens of district magnitude,comparing the properties of single-member district pluralityelections with those of multimember proportional representationelections. The empirical consequences of multi-member plurality(MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention.Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the numberand concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether theallocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test thistheory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where districtmagnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe ofpolitical parties is held constant, applying regression analysis todata from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. Theresults indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula hasthe potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerianconsequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis ofmulti-member plurality elections from the local election datasetreveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry mayincrease with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting importantdirections for future investigation of MMP rules.
format text
author BENOIT, Kenneth
author_facet BENOIT, Kenneth
author_sort BENOIT, Kenneth
title District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
title_short District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
title_full District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
title_fullStr District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
title_full_unstemmed District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
title_sort district magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2001
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4005
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soss_research/article/5263/viewcontent/benoit_2001_ejpr_av.pdf
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