On the lowest unique bid auction with multiple bids
© 2015, Newswood Ltd. All rights reseved. This study focuses on the lowest unique sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bidder is the one who places the unique bid that has the lowest value where exactly m bids per bidder are allowed. The problem can be seen as injecting a minimum into a random s...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | 雜誌 |
| 出版: |
2018
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84955591431&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/44291 |
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| 機構: | Chiang Mai University |
| 總結: | © 2015, Newswood Ltd. All rights reseved. This study focuses on the lowest unique sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bidder is the one who places the unique bid that has the lowest value where exactly m bids per bidder are allowed. The problem can be seen as injecting a minimum into a random subset of a larger subset. By assuming that bids are identical and independently placed according to a given probability distribution, we obtain various exact probabilities for the auctions, both as a bidder and an observer, for m = 1, 2. The results are obtained via the inclusion- exclusion principle. The computational results and algorithms to calculate the probabilities are also given. |
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