Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar

Achieving civilian control of security forces through constitutional reform processes has been a major challenge for young democracies or democratizing countries in Southeast Asia. In many cases, governments seeking to establish or consolidate civilian control have been faced with coups d'état...

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Main Author: Paul Chambers
Format: Journal
Published: 2018
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http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/53174
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Institution: Chiang Mai University
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spelling th-cmuir.6653943832-531742018-09-04T10:02:29Z Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar Paul Chambers Arts and Humanities Social Sciences Achieving civilian control of security forces through constitutional reform processes has been a major challenge for young democracies or democratizing countries in Southeast Asia. In many cases, governments seeking to establish or consolidate civilian control have been faced with coups d'état or the threat of coups. The successful enshrinement of laws reining in security force adventurism has often accompanied compromises which at most provide militaries with considerable latitude in their areas of decision-making or at least protect soldiers from judicial prosecution. Ultimately, the constitutional incorporation of security forces into embedded political life is no easy task. This article examines two country cases of "defective" democracies. In each case, security forces have moved towards becoming more integrated under the constitutions of civilian-led regimes. This study poses four questions. First, how did the institutionalization of security forces under civilian-led constitutions occur? Second, how did these experiences vary? Third, to what extent do these security forces today possess differing degrees of enshrined powers? And fourth, based upon these experiences, how might civilian control be sustained over time? The article argues that constitutional change acceded to by security forces more often than not results from informal bargaining and concessions by civilians. However, the initial bargain can later transform itself towards more or less security force interventionism depending upon three variables: the heritage of authoritarianism; the relative unity of civilians as opposed to the security forces; and threat environments. © 2014 ISEAS. 2018-09-04T09:44:37Z 2018-09-04T09:44:37Z 2014-01-01 Journal 0129797X 2-s2.0-84902305372 10.1353/csa.2014.0003 https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84902305372&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/53174
institution Chiang Mai University
building Chiang Mai University Library
country Thailand
collection CMU Intellectual Repository
topic Arts and Humanities
Social Sciences
spellingShingle Arts and Humanities
Social Sciences
Paul Chambers
Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar
description Achieving civilian control of security forces through constitutional reform processes has been a major challenge for young democracies or democratizing countries in Southeast Asia. In many cases, governments seeking to establish or consolidate civilian control have been faced with coups d'état or the threat of coups. The successful enshrinement of laws reining in security force adventurism has often accompanied compromises which at most provide militaries with considerable latitude in their areas of decision-making or at least protect soldiers from judicial prosecution. Ultimately, the constitutional incorporation of security forces into embedded political life is no easy task. This article examines two country cases of "defective" democracies. In each case, security forces have moved towards becoming more integrated under the constitutions of civilian-led regimes. This study poses four questions. First, how did the institutionalization of security forces under civilian-led constitutions occur? Second, how did these experiences vary? Third, to what extent do these security forces today possess differing degrees of enshrined powers? And fourth, based upon these experiences, how might civilian control be sustained over time? The article argues that constitutional change acceded to by security forces more often than not results from informal bargaining and concessions by civilians. However, the initial bargain can later transform itself towards more or less security force interventionism depending upon three variables: the heritage of authoritarianism; the relative unity of civilians as opposed to the security forces; and threat environments. © 2014 ISEAS.
format Journal
author Paul Chambers
author_facet Paul Chambers
author_sort Paul Chambers
title Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar
title_short Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar
title_full Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar
title_fullStr Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar
title_full_unstemmed Constitutional change and security forces in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Thailand and Myanmar
title_sort constitutional change and security forces in southeast asia: lessons from thailand and myanmar
publishDate 2018
url https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84902305372&origin=inward
http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/53174
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