Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This paper applies the politics of scale as a framework to examine how decentralization reforms and the associated power relations between government agencies at different levels affected disaster risk outcomes in Thailand, particularly during the 2011 floods in Central Thailand...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Danny Marks, Louis Lebel
Format: Journal
Published: 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84951877426&origin=inward
http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/56324
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Chiang Mai University
id th-cmuir.6653943832-56324
record_format dspace
spelling th-cmuir.6653943832-563242018-09-05T03:14:56Z Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand Danny Marks Louis Lebel Social Sciences © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This paper applies the politics of scale as a framework to examine how decentralization reforms and the associated power relations between government agencies at different levels affected disaster risk outcomes in Thailand, particularly during the 2011 floods in Central Thailand. It argues that Thailand's decentralization has been incomplete due to the retention of power and resources by central bureaucrats and the continued weak capacity of local administrative organizations (LAOs). In addition, the country's overall fragmented and politically polarized governance has hindered policy coherence at all levels, including the local level. Incomplete decentralization alongside persistent fragmentation along ministerial and sectoral lines has undermined disaster governance and distributed risks unevenly and unfairly. The governance weaknesses visibly materialized during the 2011 floods. Except for the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), LAOs once again had insufficient capacity to effectively respond to the floods and were given insufficient assistance by the central government. The central government sought to monopolize power, did not consult local communities, had limited capacity to enforce all of its decision, distributed risks unevenly, and overall performed poorly. Similarly, the BMA dominated other much smaller local government units within and beyond its formal boundaries. 2018-09-05T03:14:56Z 2018-09-05T03:14:56Z 2016-03-01 Journal 01973975 2-s2.0-84951877426 10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.024 https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84951877426&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/56324
institution Chiang Mai University
building Chiang Mai University Library
country Thailand
collection CMU Intellectual Repository
topic Social Sciences
spellingShingle Social Sciences
Danny Marks
Louis Lebel
Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand
description © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This paper applies the politics of scale as a framework to examine how decentralization reforms and the associated power relations between government agencies at different levels affected disaster risk outcomes in Thailand, particularly during the 2011 floods in Central Thailand. It argues that Thailand's decentralization has been incomplete due to the retention of power and resources by central bureaucrats and the continued weak capacity of local administrative organizations (LAOs). In addition, the country's overall fragmented and politically polarized governance has hindered policy coherence at all levels, including the local level. Incomplete decentralization alongside persistent fragmentation along ministerial and sectoral lines has undermined disaster governance and distributed risks unevenly and unfairly. The governance weaknesses visibly materialized during the 2011 floods. Except for the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), LAOs once again had insufficient capacity to effectively respond to the floods and were given insufficient assistance by the central government. The central government sought to monopolize power, did not consult local communities, had limited capacity to enforce all of its decision, distributed risks unevenly, and overall performed poorly. Similarly, the BMA dominated other much smaller local government units within and beyond its formal boundaries.
format Journal
author Danny Marks
Louis Lebel
author_facet Danny Marks
Louis Lebel
author_sort Danny Marks
title Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand
title_short Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand
title_full Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand
title_fullStr Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand
title_full_unstemmed Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand
title_sort disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in central thailand
publishDate 2018
url https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84951877426&origin=inward
http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/56324
_version_ 1681424670745690112