Improved security analyses for CBC MACs
We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have...
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th-cmuir.6653943832-616072018-09-11T08:58:58Z Improved security analyses for CBC MACs Mihir Bellare Krzysztof Pietrzak Phillip Rogaway Computer Science Mathematics We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length: We go on to give an improved analysis of the encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on queried messages. Letting m be the block length of the longest query, our bounds are about mq2/2nfor the basic CBC MAC and m°(1)q2/2nfor the encrypted CBC MAC, improving prior bounds of m2q2/2n. The new bounds translate into improved guarantees on the probability of forging these MACs. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2005. 2018-09-11T08:55:54Z 2018-09-11T08:55:54Z 2006-06-23 Book Series 16113349 03029743 2-s2.0-33745136125 https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=33745136125&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/61607 |
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Computer Science Mathematics Mihir Bellare Krzysztof Pietrzak Phillip Rogaway Improved security analyses for CBC MACs |
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We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length: We go on to give an improved analysis of the encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on queried messages. Letting m be the block length of the longest query, our bounds are about mq2/2nfor the basic CBC MAC and m°(1)q2/2nfor the encrypted CBC MAC, improving prior bounds of m2q2/2n. The new bounds translate into improved guarantees on the probability of forging these MACs. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2005. |
format |
Book Series |
author |
Mihir Bellare Krzysztof Pietrzak Phillip Rogaway |
author_facet |
Mihir Bellare Krzysztof Pietrzak Phillip Rogaway |
author_sort |
Mihir Bellare |
title |
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs |
title_short |
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs |
title_full |
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs |
title_fullStr |
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs |
title_full_unstemmed |
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs |
title_sort |
improved security analyses for cbc macs |
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2018 |
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https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=33745136125&origin=inward http://cmuir.cmu.ac.th/jspui/handle/6653943832/61607 |
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