Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance
We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders' value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the C...
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Main Authors: | Pornsit Jiraporn, Pandej Chintrakarn, Yixin Liu |
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Other Authors: | Pennsylvania State University |
Format: | Article |
Published: |
2018
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/123456789/13874 |
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Institution: | Mahidol University |
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