SECURITY ANALYSIS OF TOR HIDDEN SERVICES VERSION 3: MITM AND CENSORSHIP

• Main Author: Adari, Kevin
• Format: Theses
• Language: Indonesia
• Subjects: Teknik (Rekayasa, enjinering dan kegiatan berkaitan)
• Online Access: https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/47993
• Institution: Institut Teknologi Bandung

Tor is one of most popular low-latency anonymous communication networks. In addition to provide anonymity for users, Tor also provide anonymity to the service provider through hidden service protocol. In September 2017, The Tor Project, Inc. launched Tor with hidden services version 3 support. Hidden services version 3 has some improvements in cryptography algorithm, onion address, introduction protocol, rendezvous protocol, and directory protocol. A number of research projects have been conducted regarding security of hidden services. However, most of the research does not include hidden services version 3 protocol into consideration. Therefore, this study aims to shows how hidden services version 3 protocol works against previously known attacks. Main focus is around two kind of attacks, i.e. man-in-the-middle attack and censor attack. This work also provides complementary insight from empirical analysis of real Tor network data. This study shows that security of hidden services against man-in-the-middle attack relies on Introduction Point, Rendezvous Point, and descriptor. Security of hidden services against censoring relies on HSDir, Introduction Point, or descriptor. Adversary has only 2.97% success rate of Sybil attack to compromise Introduction Point by controlling 53 relays with 5 days uptime and 100 KB/s bandwidth. Adversary has only 1% success rate of Sybil attack to compromise Rendezvous Point by controlling 54 relays with 100 KB/s bandwidth. The success of these attacks will also be limited to only 24 hours.