LOCAL PREDATORY ELITE ? Potret Relasi Politisi-Pengusaha Dengan Penguasa Studi Relasi Politisi-Pengusaha di DPRD dengan Elite Eksekutif dalam Penganggaran Pembangunan Infrastruktur di Kabupaten OKU Pasca Pemilu 2009
The aim of this study is to reveal the pattern of relationships between local businessmen-politicians who dominate the legislature with the authority in governance Ogan Komering Ulu regency of South Sumatera after the 2009 election. To determine the pattern of relationships, this research study focu...
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Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Theses and Dissertations NonPeerReviewed |
Published: |
[Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada
2013
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://repository.ugm.ac.id/119663/ http://etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=penelitian_detail&sub=PenelitianDetail&act=view&typ=html&buku_id=59666 |
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Institution: | Universitas Gadjah Mada |
Summary: | The aim of this study is to reveal the pattern of relationships
between local businessmen-politicians who dominate the legislature with
the authority in governance Ogan Komering Ulu regency of South
Sumatera after the 2009 election. To determine the pattern of
relationships, this research study focuses on the budgeting policy of local
infrastructure development. The study used qualitative methods of data
collection prioritize research through in-depth interviews and the use of
secondary data that is relevant. The formulation of the problem posed
here: how patterns of relationships between politicians-businessmen in
parliament by the executive elite in budgeting for infrastructure
development in after the 2009 election in Ogan Komering Ulu regency?
This study combines three theoretical frameworks, namely: the
theory of patronage, cronyism and predatory state as a framework for the
study analysis. The merger of these three is deliberately done to analysis
object complexity conscientious writer. But the main argument is that the
authors look at how the three theories are complementary between them.
Where the predatory practices in Indonesia often also work in the frame of
political patronage and cronyism that occurs between societal actors and
local-state actors or between local-state actors themselves. In this study,
the politician-businessmen in parliament and executive elites of local
government placed as local-state actors relate to each other in the informal
networks that framed the practices of predatory state.
The results showed that the domination of the politicianbusinessman
in OKU regency legislature after the 2009 elections has
created a network and patterns of relationships of patronage politics and
crony hunters seeking a ruling that framed the state predatory practices in
the budgeting process of regional development. This is evidenced by some
of the findings. First, the existence of hijacking by politicians-businessmen
with conspiring with the authorities in the budgeting process. This
hijacking occurs in three budget cycles, namely: (1) the planning and
arranging budget in the executive level, (2) the ratification and budgeting
allocation process in the parliament, and (3) the process of budget
implementation, especially in the bidding process of construction project
tenders. Secondly, has been a monopoly of tenders of regional
infrastructure development projects by the politician-businessman in OKU
regency legislature. Third, the services were exchanged between the
politician-businessmen with rulers who are in a relationship of patronage
and crony ties hunter rents are public goods. |
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