LOCAL PREDATORY ELITE ? Potret Relasi Politisi-Pengusaha Dengan Penguasa Studi Relasi Politisi-Pengusaha di DPRD dengan Elite Eksekutif dalam Penganggaran Pembangunan Infrastruktur di Kabupaten OKU Pasca Pemilu 2009

• Main Authors: , Muhammad Mahsun, , Nur Azizah, SIP, M.Sc
• Format: Theses and Dissertations NonPeerReviewed
• Published: [Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada 2013
• Subjects: ETD
• Online Access: https://repository.ugm.ac.id/119663/; http://etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=penelitian_detail&sub=PenelitianDetail&act=view&typ=html&buku_id=59666
• Institution: Universitas Gadjah Mada

The aim of this study is to reveal the pattern of relationships between local businessmen-politicians who dominate the legislature with the authority in governance Ogan Komering Ulu regency of South Sumatera after the 2009 election. To determine the pattern of relationships, this research study focuses on the budgeting policy of local infrastructure development. The study used qualitative methods of data collection prioritize research through in-depth interviews and the use of secondary data that is relevant. The formulation of the problem posed here: how patterns of relationships between politicians-businessmen in parliament by the executive elite in budgeting for infrastructure development in after the 2009 election in Ogan Komering Ulu regency? This study combines three theoretical frameworks, namely: the theory of patronage, cronyism and predatory state as a framework for the study analysis. The merger of these three is deliberately done to analysis object complexity conscientious writer. But the main argument is that the authors look at how the three theories are complementary between them. Where the predatory practices in Indonesia often also work in the frame of political patronage and cronyism that occurs between societal actors and local-state actors or between local-state actors themselves. In this study, the politician-businessmen in parliament and executive elites of local government placed as local-state actors relate to each other in the informal networks that framed the practices of predatory state. The results showed that the domination of the politicianbusinessman in OKU regency legislature after the 2009 elections has created a network and patterns of relationships of patronage politics and crony hunters seeking a ruling that framed the state predatory practices in the budgeting process of regional development. This is evidenced by some of the findings. First, the existence of hijacking by politicians-businessmen with conspiring with the authorities in the budgeting process. This hijacking occurs in three budget cycles, namely: (1) the planning and arranging budget in the executive level, (2) the ratification and budgeting allocation process in the parliament, and (3) the process of budget implementation, especially in the bidding process of construction project tenders. Secondly, has been a monopoly of tenders of regional infrastructure development projects by the politician-businessman in OKU regency legislature. Third, the services were exchanged between the politician-businessmen with rulers who are in a relationship of patronage and crony ties hunter rents are public goods.