Framing effects in a simple barga[i]ning experiment: Testing for self-serving bias and hot and cold effects

• Main Authors: Cheng, Stephen, Lee, Sang Seok, Revilla, Celestine Fatima, Roque, Robbin Mae
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Animo Repository 2006
• Subjects: Negotiation > Mathematical models; Economics
• Online Access: https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14363
• Institution: De La Salle University

This paper investigates whether framing effects consistently appear in experimental situations. Simple bargaining games are used to test the existence of (1) self-serving bias and (2) hot and cold effects, which are known to be triggered by the use of frames conducive to them. The results of the study show that framing effects do not always hold in the ways they are predicted to be: self-serving bias is subtle when people are provided with an alternative that ensures them compensation enough to make up for opportunity loss hot and cold effects do not hold in the expected ways when experimental design is open to inertia. The experimental results also exhibit that people (1) choose to be efficient when they are in the situation to make offers (2) take advantage of others who chose to be efficient, but (3) behave in inconclusive ways when they are given choices to punish others.