Reciprocity, social approval and equity considerations: A gift-exchange experiment in one-shot and repeated interaction

• Main Authors: Diaz, Maria Melissa Anne L., Fang, Richmond G., Go, Jesylyne Y., Uy, Anjelica B.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Animo Repository 2008
• Online Access: https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14732
• Institution: De La Salle University

This experimental study investigates how effort behavior of workers is influenced by intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives under the environment of incompletely specified contractual relations of a gift-exchange game. Three treatments which involve one-shot and repeated interactions were employed in the experiment namely, Stranger Treatment, Partner Treatment, and Social Approval Treatment. This paper finds evidence that reciprocity exists in workers’ effort behavior, reputation building has an effect and social approval has the most significant and positive effect on workers' effort behavior. It can be implied from this study that efficiency gains between employers and employees can be realized without depending solely on coercion and financial incentives as motivators. Other motivators are essential, that has something to do with reciprocity.