On cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors game
This thesis is an exposition of the articles written by Eric Bahel and Hans Haller [2] [3]. The aim of this study is to identify the unique Nash equilibrium of a cycle-based game under a strict preference relation. In particular, the game Rock-Paper-Scissors has a unique Nash equilibrium where each...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Animo Repository
2016
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| 在線閱讀: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14923 |
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| 機構: | De La Salle University |
| 語言: | English |
| 總結: | This thesis is an exposition of the articles written by Eric Bahel and Hans Haller [2] [3]. The aim of this study is to identify the unique Nash equilibrium of a cycle-based game under a strict preference relation. In particular, the game Rock-Paper-Scissors has a unique Nash equilibrium where each action is given a weight of one-third. Furthermore, this study discusses and illustrates the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria for a two-player zero-sum game based on a cyclic preference relation. There exist two cases for this characterization. First, if the game has even actions, there exists a continuum of mixed strategies. In the case of odd actions, a unique Nash equilibrium is obtained. |
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