On cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors game

• Main Authors: Ang, Andrea Justine R., Pineda, Luis Gabriel P.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Animo Repository 2016
• Subjects: Rock-paper-scissors (Game); Game theory; Mathematics
• Online Access: https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14923
• Institution: De La Salle University

This thesis is an exposition of the articles written by Eric Bahel and Hans Haller [2] [3]. The aim of this study is to identify the unique Nash equilibrium of a cycle-based game under a strict preference relation. In particular, the game Rock-Paper-Scissors has a unique Nash equilibrium where each action is given a weight of one-third. Furthermore, this study discusses and illustrates the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria for a two-player zero-sum game based on a cyclic preference relation. There exist two cases for this characterization. First, if the game has even actions, there exists a continuum of mixed strategies. In the case of odd actions, a unique Nash equilibrium is obtained.