Incumbent competition and pandering

Two politicians choose an action to maximize popularity with only partial information on the popular choice, the choice preferred by the public, and the socially optimal choice, the choice that maximizes public welfare. The model explores the decisions of politicians and the policies formed under a...

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Main Author: Go, Anne Marie L.
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Published: Animo Repository 2021
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Online Access:https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/9511
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Institution: De La Salle University
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spelling oai:animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph:faculty_research-112682023-07-03T00:51:41Z Incumbent competition and pandering Go, Anne Marie L. Two politicians choose an action to maximize popularity with only partial information on the popular choice, the choice preferred by the public, and the socially optimal choice, the choice that maximizes public welfare. The model explores the decisions of politicians and the policies formed under a relative popularity framework. Although choosing the popular choice increases the popularity of politicians, pandering costs can be incurred when the socially optimal choice is revealed to be different from the popular choice. The paper looks at the types of policies passed for salient issues and non-salient issues given different levels of clarity on public opinion. I find that for salient issues, a divided public is better than a united but ill-informed one. For nonsalient issues, policies are always passed when public opinion is clear, while politicians diverge strategically under low policy payoffs when public opinion is unclear. 2021-07-01T07:00:00Z text https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/9511 Faculty Research Work Animo Repository Legislation Political Science
institution De La Salle University
building De La Salle University Library
continent Asia
country Philippines
Philippines
content_provider De La Salle University Library
collection DLSU Institutional Repository
topic Legislation
Political Science
spellingShingle Legislation
Political Science
Go, Anne Marie L.
Incumbent competition and pandering
description Two politicians choose an action to maximize popularity with only partial information on the popular choice, the choice preferred by the public, and the socially optimal choice, the choice that maximizes public welfare. The model explores the decisions of politicians and the policies formed under a relative popularity framework. Although choosing the popular choice increases the popularity of politicians, pandering costs can be incurred when the socially optimal choice is revealed to be different from the popular choice. The paper looks at the types of policies passed for salient issues and non-salient issues given different levels of clarity on public opinion. I find that for salient issues, a divided public is better than a united but ill-informed one. For nonsalient issues, policies are always passed when public opinion is clear, while politicians diverge strategically under low policy payoffs when public opinion is unclear.
format text
author Go, Anne Marie L.
author_facet Go, Anne Marie L.
author_sort Go, Anne Marie L.
title Incumbent competition and pandering
title_short Incumbent competition and pandering
title_full Incumbent competition and pandering
title_fullStr Incumbent competition and pandering
title_full_unstemmed Incumbent competition and pandering
title_sort incumbent competition and pandering
publisher Animo Repository
publishDate 2021
url https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/9511
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