Vote buying: Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences
We consider a dynamic model of lobbying with two opposing lobbyists vying for a legislator’s support, whose preferences are uncertain. The results show that the degree of uncertainty of legislator preferences has a direct effect on the bidding strategy of lobbyists. When the degree of uncertainty is...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| 格式: | text |
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Animo Repository
2018
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| 在線閱讀: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/9508 |
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| 機構: | De La Salle University |