Incumbent competition and pandering
Two politicians choose an action to maximize popularity with only partial information on the popular choice, the choice preferred by the public, and the socially optimal choice, the choice that maximizes public welfare. The model explores the decisions of politicians and the policies formed under a...
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Main Author: | Go, Anne Marie L. |
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Format: | text |
Published: |
Animo Repository
2021
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Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/10958 |
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Institution: | De La Salle University |
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