On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology
Philosophers have perennially contended with the advancements of science, In more recent times, philosophers like John Searle and Hilary Putnam have criticized the view, sometimes called "computational psychology" that the human mind is some sort of computer, This paper argues that the deb...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Published: |
Animo Repository
2009
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/12513 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | De La Salle University |
| Summary: | Philosophers have perennially contended with the advancements of science, In more recent times, philosophers like John Searle and Hilary Putnam have criticized the view, sometimes called "computational psychology" that the human mind is some sort of computer, This paper argues that the debates bring to the fore the importance of rethinking the conception of one's self as science and technology advance, To support this, the paper also claims that Putnam is not necessarily at odds with Searle's argument and recognize that Putnam has a different starting point. |
|---|