On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology
Philosophers have perennially contended with the advancements of science, In more recent times, philosophers like John Searle and Hilary Putnam have criticized the view, sometimes called "computational psychology" that the human mind is some sort of computer, This paper argues that the deb...
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oai:animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph:faculty_research-144832024-05-28T05:55:15Z On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology Apolega, Dennis De Guzman Philosophers have perennially contended with the advancements of science, In more recent times, philosophers like John Searle and Hilary Putnam have criticized the view, sometimes called "computational psychology" that the human mind is some sort of computer, This paper argues that the debates bring to the fore the importance of rethinking the conception of one's self as science and technology advance, To support this, the paper also claims that Putnam is not necessarily at odds with Searle's argument and recognize that Putnam has a different starting point. 2009-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/12513 Faculty Research Work Animo Repository Philosophy of mind Self (Philosophy) John R. Searle Hilary Putnam Philosophy |
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Philosophy of mind Self (Philosophy) John R. Searle Hilary Putnam Philosophy |
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Philosophy of mind Self (Philosophy) John R. Searle Hilary Putnam Philosophy Apolega, Dennis De Guzman On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
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Philosophers have perennially contended with the advancements of science, In more recent times, philosophers like John Searle and Hilary Putnam have criticized the view, sometimes called "computational psychology" that the human mind is some sort of computer, This paper argues that the debates bring to the fore the importance of rethinking the conception of one's self as science and technology advance, To support this, the paper also claims that Putnam is not necessarily at odds with Searle's argument and recognize that Putnam has a different starting point. |
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text |
author |
Apolega, Dennis De Guzman |
author_facet |
Apolega, Dennis De Guzman |
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Apolega, Dennis De Guzman |
title |
On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
title_short |
On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
title_full |
On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
title_fullStr |
On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
title_full_unstemmed |
On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
title_sort |
on searle and putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology |
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Animo Repository |
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2009 |
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https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/12513 |
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1800919050968104960 |