When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers

This study explores the implications of interfirm status differentials for firm behaviors in corporate takeover transactions. We argue that the more the status differential between two firms is aligned with expectations of their roles embedded in the specific economic activity, the easier it is for...

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Main Authors: Shen, Rui, Tang, Yi, Chen, Guoli
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2013
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100548
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/17890
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1005482023-05-19T06:44:40Z When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers Shen, Rui Tang, Yi Chen, Guoli Nanyang Business School DRNTU::Business This study explores the implications of interfirm status differentials for firm behaviors in corporate takeover transactions. We argue that the more the status differential between two firms is aligned with expectations of their roles embedded in the specific economic activity, the easier it is for them to agree on the appropriate means to reach consensus on the transaction. Using the empirical context of the U.S. corporate takeover market, we found that the greater the status differential between an acquirer and a target, the more positively the market reacts to both the acquirer and the target upon the announcement of the acquisition deal, the more likely it is for the deal to be completed, and the more likely the acquirer is to achieve better post-acquisition performance. 2013-11-29T01:05:36Z 2019-12-06T20:24:18Z 2013-11-29T01:05:36Z 2019-12-06T20:24:18Z 2013 2013 Journal Article Shen, R., Tang, Y., & Chen, G. (2014). When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers. Strategic management journal, 35(13), 2012-2030. 0143-2095 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100548 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/17890 10.1002/smj.2194 en Strategic management journal © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 49 p.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Business
spellingShingle DRNTU::Business
Shen, Rui
Tang, Yi
Chen, Guoli
When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
description This study explores the implications of interfirm status differentials for firm behaviors in corporate takeover transactions. We argue that the more the status differential between two firms is aligned with expectations of their roles embedded in the specific economic activity, the easier it is for them to agree on the appropriate means to reach consensus on the transaction. Using the empirical context of the U.S. corporate takeover market, we found that the greater the status differential between an acquirer and a target, the more positively the market reacts to both the acquirer and the target upon the announcement of the acquisition deal, the more likely it is for the deal to be completed, and the more likely the acquirer is to achieve better post-acquisition performance.
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Shen, Rui
Tang, Yi
Chen, Guoli
format Article
author Shen, Rui
Tang, Yi
Chen, Guoli
author_sort Shen, Rui
title When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
title_short When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
title_full When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
title_fullStr When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
title_full_unstemmed When the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
title_sort when the role fits : how firm status differentials affect corporate takeovers
publishDate 2013
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100548
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/17890
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