Informative advertising in a distribution channel

In this paper, we study how channel structure (decentralized vs centralized) and specified allocation of product advertising authority affect final advertising content and profits when consumers face uncertainty about both product match and retail price, and must incur a sunk cost to visit the retai...

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Main Authors: Shi, Hongyan, Liu, Yunchuan, Petruzzi, Nicholas C.
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2020
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/141178
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1411782023-05-19T07:31:16Z Informative advertising in a distribution channel Shi, Hongyan Liu, Yunchuan Petruzzi, Nicholas C. Nanyang Business School Business::Marketing OR in Marketing Price Advertising In this paper, we study how channel structure (decentralized vs centralized) and specified allocation of product advertising authority affect final advertising content and profits when consumers face uncertainty about both product match and retail price, and must incur a sunk cost to visit the retail store before making a purchase. We develop a game-theoretic framework in which a manufacturer and a retailer are defined as leader and follower, respectively, to model the strategic interactions and the optimal advertising and pricing decisions of channel members. In this context, we find that channel decentralization may lead to greater advertising content. Moreover, we find that if the manufacturer has product advertising authority additional to the retailer's product advertising authority, then both the product advertising provision and the price advertising provision can be greater. This additional product advertising authority can lead to the manufacturer's higher but the retailer's lower profit with increased overall channel profits. However, if the manufacturer has exclusive product advertising authority, as compared to the case in which both channel members can advertise product, the manufacturer's exclusive product advertising authority can lead to a decreased product advertising provision as well as a decreased price advertising provision; and it may even hurt the manufacturer while benefiting the retailer. We also find that a shift of exclusive product advertising authority from the retailer to the manufacturer leads to a product advertising provision that is such that more consumers will visit the store and purchase the product, which benefits the overall channel for a large parameter range. 2020-06-04T09:19:04Z 2020-06-04T09:19:04Z 2018 Journal Article Shi, H., Liu, Y., & Petruzzi, N. C. (2019). Informative advertising in a distribution channel. European Journal of Operational Research, 274(2), 773-787. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2018.10.042 0377-2217 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/141178 10.1016/j.ejor.2018.10.042 2-s2.0-85056240348 2 274 773 787 en European Journal of Operational Research © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Business::Marketing
OR in Marketing
Price Advertising
spellingShingle Business::Marketing
OR in Marketing
Price Advertising
Shi, Hongyan
Liu, Yunchuan
Petruzzi, Nicholas C.
Informative advertising in a distribution channel
description In this paper, we study how channel structure (decentralized vs centralized) and specified allocation of product advertising authority affect final advertising content and profits when consumers face uncertainty about both product match and retail price, and must incur a sunk cost to visit the retail store before making a purchase. We develop a game-theoretic framework in which a manufacturer and a retailer are defined as leader and follower, respectively, to model the strategic interactions and the optimal advertising and pricing decisions of channel members. In this context, we find that channel decentralization may lead to greater advertising content. Moreover, we find that if the manufacturer has product advertising authority additional to the retailer's product advertising authority, then both the product advertising provision and the price advertising provision can be greater. This additional product advertising authority can lead to the manufacturer's higher but the retailer's lower profit with increased overall channel profits. However, if the manufacturer has exclusive product advertising authority, as compared to the case in which both channel members can advertise product, the manufacturer's exclusive product advertising authority can lead to a decreased product advertising provision as well as a decreased price advertising provision; and it may even hurt the manufacturer while benefiting the retailer. We also find that a shift of exclusive product advertising authority from the retailer to the manufacturer leads to a product advertising provision that is such that more consumers will visit the store and purchase the product, which benefits the overall channel for a large parameter range.
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Shi, Hongyan
Liu, Yunchuan
Petruzzi, Nicholas C.
format Article
author Shi, Hongyan
Liu, Yunchuan
Petruzzi, Nicholas C.
author_sort Shi, Hongyan
title Informative advertising in a distribution channel
title_short Informative advertising in a distribution channel
title_full Informative advertising in a distribution channel
title_fullStr Informative advertising in a distribution channel
title_full_unstemmed Informative advertising in a distribution channel
title_sort informative advertising in a distribution channel
publishDate 2020
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/141178
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