Unfolding China’s state-owned corporate empires and mitigating agency hazards: Effects of foreign investments and innovativeness
Integrating agency and institutional perspectives, we describe how China’s socio-political institutions create state-owned corporate empires with unique agency conflicts. We develop a framework demonstrating how economically unjustified firm expansion, i.e. empire building, mediates the relationship...
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Main Authors: | Zhu, John Jian Jun, Tse, Caleb H., Li, Xu |
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Other Authors: | Nanyang Business School |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2020
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144463 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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