Non-negotiable : why moral naturalism cannot do away with categorical reasons
Some versions of moral naturalismare faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that severa...
Saved in:
Main Author: | Luco, Andrés Carlos |
---|---|
Other Authors: | School of Humanities |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2021
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145725 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Are there distinctively moral reasons?
by: Forcehimes, Andrew T., et al.
Published: (2019) -
Advertising primed: how professional identity affects moral reasoning
by: Schauster, Erin, et al.
Published: (2022) -
Does power corrupt the mind? The influence of power on moral reasoning and self-interested behavior
by: Giurge, Laura M., et al.
Published: (2022) -
Probabilistic reasoning on background net: An application to text categorization
by: Lo, S.-L., et al.
Published: (2014) -
NATURALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CATEGORICAL REASONS
by: NG HAN WEI MELVIN
Published: (2016)