Mis-selling in the insurance industry

• Main Authors: Tham, Fernanda Xiang Min, Ho, Hwee En, Lim, Hazel Si Yuan
• Other Authors: Yan Jubo
• Format: Final Year Project
• Language: English
• Published: Nanyang Technological University 2021
• Subjects: Social sciences::Economic theory
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/148323
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

Based on current behavioural economics literature, priming individuals of their industry-specific identity and involving the aspect of reputation can influence individuals’ likelihood to be dishonest. Thus, the primary aim of the study is to extend the literature on dishonest behaviours to mis-selling in the insurance industry, by assessing the effects of priming and reputation on the likelihood that individuals (i) accurately presents the policy that they are selling and (ii) recommends an appropriate policy to the buyers. 224 participants took part in an economics experiment that paralleled real-life insurance selling. To assess the prevalence of mis-selling amongst sellers, participants who were assigned as sellers had to decide (1) the policy that they wanted to sell and (2) if they wanted to present their policies accurately to their buyer. Proportions test and binary logistic regressions were conducted to assess the independent and interactive effects of priming and reputation on sellers’ selling behaviours. Our results showed that (i) when the sellers were primed and had their reputation at stake, they were more likely to be honest in telling their buyers the type of policy they are selling, and (ii) when the sellers were primed, they were more likely to sell an insurance policy that matched with their buyers’ health type. Our research adds on to the current literature by investigating factors that increase honesty in the insurance industry.