Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache

In virtualized platforms, virtual machines are logically isolated by privileged hypervisors. These hypervisors provide abstraction and prevent virtual machines or processes from communicating with one another. Although the prevention of direct communication is enforced by these privileged hypervisor...

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محفوظ في:
التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Ng, Joel Wei Jie
مؤلفون آخرون: Zhang Tianwei
التنسيق: Final Year Project
اللغة:English
منشور في: Nanyang Technological University 2021
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الوصول للمادة أونلاين:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/148686
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1486862021-05-15T12:50:49Z Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache Ng, Joel Wei Jie Zhang Tianwei School of Computer Science and Engineering tianwei.zhang@ntu.edu.sg Engineering::Computer science and engineering In virtualized platforms, virtual machines are logically isolated by privileged hypervisors. These hypervisors provide abstraction and prevent virtual machines or processes from communicating with one another. Although the prevention of direct communication is enforced by these privileged hypervisors, these virtual machines or processes utilize the same hardware components like CPU core, CPU cache, bus, DRAM, etc. This sharing of hardware components opens up the possibility of two processes exchanging messages through what we call covert channels. In this paper, I would like to determine if the bandwidth L1 cache covert channels are useful in data exfiltration or are of any use to begin with, and compare it with L2 cache covert channels [1] Bachelor of Engineering (Computer Science) 2021-05-15T12:50:49Z 2021-05-15T12:50:49Z 2021 Final Year Project (FYP) Ng, J. W. J. (2021). Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/148686 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/148686 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Computer science and engineering
spellingShingle Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Ng, Joel Wei Jie
Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache
description In virtualized platforms, virtual machines are logically isolated by privileged hypervisors. These hypervisors provide abstraction and prevent virtual machines or processes from communicating with one another. Although the prevention of direct communication is enforced by these privileged hypervisors, these virtual machines or processes utilize the same hardware components like CPU core, CPU cache, bus, DRAM, etc. This sharing of hardware components opens up the possibility of two processes exchanging messages through what we call covert channels. In this paper, I would like to determine if the bandwidth L1 cache covert channels are useful in data exfiltration or are of any use to begin with, and compare it with L2 cache covert channels [1]
author2 Zhang Tianwei
author_facet Zhang Tianwei
Ng, Joel Wei Jie
format Final Year Project
author Ng, Joel Wei Jie
author_sort Ng, Joel Wei Jie
title Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache
title_short Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache
title_full Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache
title_fullStr Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache
title_full_unstemmed Cross-VM micro-architectural covert channel attacks in L1 cache
title_sort cross-vm micro-architectural covert channel attacks in l1 cache
publisher Nanyang Technological University
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/148686
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