Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation

We present a side-channel-attack (SCA) resistant asynchronous-logic (async-logic) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) accelerator with dual-hiding SCA countermeasures, i.e. the amplitude moderation (vertical dimension) and the time moderation (horizontal dimension). There are five contributions in t...

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Main Authors: Chong, Kwen-Siong, Ng, Jun-Sheng, Chen, Juncheng, Lwin, Ne Kyaw Zwa, Kyaw, Nay Aung, Ho, Weng-Geng, Chang, Joseph, Gwee, Bah-Hwee
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151198
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1511982021-06-15T01:34:27Z Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation Chong, Kwen-Siong Ng, Jun-Sheng Chen, Juncheng Lwin, Ne Kyaw Zwa Kyaw, Nay Aung Ho, Weng-Geng Chang, Joseph Gwee, Bah-Hwee School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Centre for Integrated Circuits and Systems Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Hardware Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Asynchronous Circuits We present a side-channel-attack (SCA) resistant asynchronous-logic (async-logic) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) accelerator with dual-hiding SCA countermeasures, i.e. the amplitude moderation (vertical dimension) and the time moderation (horizontal dimension). There are five contributions in this paper. First, we propose an async-logic design flow with relative timing to simplify the AES realization in Field-Programmable-Gate-Array (FPGA). Second, we optimize completion detection circuits therein to achieve a low power/overhead solution. Third, we propose a randomized delay line control and a data-propagation control to amplify the dual-hiding SCA countermeasures for our async-logic AES accelerator. Fourth, we validate the async-logic design flow based on two commercially-available Sakura-X and Arty-A7 FPGA boards. Fifth, we comprehensively evaluate 74 SCA attacking models for our async-logic AES accelerator on these two boards, and compare the results against a benchmarking AES based on synchronous logic (sync-logic). We show that our async-logic AES accelerator is unbreakable within 1 million electromagnetic (EM) traces where the sync-logic counterpart is breakable within < 30K EM traces. To our best knowledge, our async-logic AES accelerator is the first async-logic AES design evaluated comprehensively at the first/last round, at various attacking locations (i.e. before/after Substitute-Box), and with various Hamming weight/distance, bit model, and zero-model of SCAs. National Research Foundation (NRF) Accepted version This research project is supported by the National Research Foundation, Singapore under its National Cybersecurity R&D (NCR) Research Programme in Assuring Hardware Security by Design in Systems on Chip, SOCure (NRF2018NCR-NCR002- 001), and NTUtive GAP fund (NGF-2017-03-013). 2021-06-15T01:34:27Z 2021-06-15T01:34:27Z 2021 Journal Article Chong, K., Ng, J., Chen, J., Lwin, N. K. Z., Kyaw, N. A., Ho, W., Chang, J. & Gwee, B. (2021). Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation. IEEE Journal On Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems, 11(2), 343-356. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JETCAS.2021.3077887 2156-3365 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151198 10.1109/JETCAS.2021.3077887 2 11 343 356 en NRF2018NCR-NCR002- 001 NGF-2017-03-013 IEEE Journal on Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems © 2021 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/JETCAS.2021.3077887 application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Hardware
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Asynchronous Circuits
spellingShingle Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Hardware
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Asynchronous Circuits
Chong, Kwen-Siong
Ng, Jun-Sheng
Chen, Juncheng
Lwin, Ne Kyaw Zwa
Kyaw, Nay Aung
Ho, Weng-Geng
Chang, Joseph
Gwee, Bah-Hwee
Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation
description We present a side-channel-attack (SCA) resistant asynchronous-logic (async-logic) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) accelerator with dual-hiding SCA countermeasures, i.e. the amplitude moderation (vertical dimension) and the time moderation (horizontal dimension). There are five contributions in this paper. First, we propose an async-logic design flow with relative timing to simplify the AES realization in Field-Programmable-Gate-Array (FPGA). Second, we optimize completion detection circuits therein to achieve a low power/overhead solution. Third, we propose a randomized delay line control and a data-propagation control to amplify the dual-hiding SCA countermeasures for our async-logic AES accelerator. Fourth, we validate the async-logic design flow based on two commercially-available Sakura-X and Arty-A7 FPGA boards. Fifth, we comprehensively evaluate 74 SCA attacking models for our async-logic AES accelerator on these two boards, and compare the results against a benchmarking AES based on synchronous logic (sync-logic). We show that our async-logic AES accelerator is unbreakable within 1 million electromagnetic (EM) traces where the sync-logic counterpart is breakable within < 30K EM traces. To our best knowledge, our async-logic AES accelerator is the first async-logic AES design evaluated comprehensively at the first/last round, at various attacking locations (i.e. before/after Substitute-Box), and with various Hamming weight/distance, bit model, and zero-model of SCAs.
author2 School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
author_facet School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Chong, Kwen-Siong
Ng, Jun-Sheng
Chen, Juncheng
Lwin, Ne Kyaw Zwa
Kyaw, Nay Aung
Ho, Weng-Geng
Chang, Joseph
Gwee, Bah-Hwee
format Article
author Chong, Kwen-Siong
Ng, Jun-Sheng
Chen, Juncheng
Lwin, Ne Kyaw Zwa
Kyaw, Nay Aung
Ho, Weng-Geng
Chang, Joseph
Gwee, Bah-Hwee
author_sort Chong, Kwen-Siong
title Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation
title_short Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation
title_full Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation
title_fullStr Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation
title_full_unstemmed Dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant FPGA-based asynchronous-logic AES : design, countermeasures and evaluation
title_sort dual-hiding side-channel-attack resistant fpga-based asynchronous-logic aes : design, countermeasures and evaluation
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/151198
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