Hedonic and non-hedonic bias toward the future

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Greene, Preston, Latham, Andrew J., Miller, Kristie, Norton, James
• مؤلفون آخرون: School of Humanities
• التنسيق: مقال
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2021
• الموضوعات: Humanities::Philosophy; Time Bias; Bias Toward The Future
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152075

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This paper experimentally tests these descriptive hypotheses. While, as predicted, we found first-person hedonic future-bias, we did not find that participants were time-neutral in all other conditions. Hence, the presumed asymmetry of hedonic/non-hedonic and first/third-person preferences cannot be used to argue for the irrationality of future-bias, since no such asymmetries exist. Instead, we develop a more fine-grained approach, according to which three factors—positive/negative valence, first/third-person, and hedonic/non-hedonic—each independently influence, but do not determine, whether an event is treated in a future-biased or a time-neutral way. We discuss the upshots of these results for the debate over the rationality of future-bias.