Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion

I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee" to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact...

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Main Author: Yin, Huaxiang
Other Authors: College of Business (Nanyang Business School)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152668
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1526682021-09-09T01:08:30Z Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion Yin, Huaxiang College of Business (Nanyang Business School) Accounting Business::Accounting Indirect Reciprocity Employee-based Control Information Policies Discretion Manager Type I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee" to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically. 2021-09-09T01:08:29Z 2021-09-09T01:08:29Z 2021 Journal Article Yin, H. (2021). Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion. The Accounting Review, 96(5), 365-388. https://dx.doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2015-0219 0001-4826 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152668 10.2308/TAR-2015-0219 5 96 365 388 en The Accounting Review © 2021 American Accounting Association. All rights reserved.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Business::Accounting
Indirect Reciprocity
Employee-based Control
Information Policies
Discretion
Manager Type
spellingShingle Business::Accounting
Indirect Reciprocity
Employee-based Control
Information Policies
Discretion
Manager Type
Yin, Huaxiang
Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
description I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee" to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically.
author2 College of Business (Nanyang Business School)
author_facet College of Business (Nanyang Business School)
Yin, Huaxiang
format Article
author Yin, Huaxiang
author_sort Yin, Huaxiang
title Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
title_short Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
title_full Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
title_fullStr Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
title_full_unstemmed Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
title_sort can employees exercise control over managers? the role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
publishDate 2021
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152668
_version_ 1710686939025244160