Mencius and Hutcheson on empathy-based benevolence
Mencius and Francis Hutcheson are often interpreted as “moral sentimentalists” since they argue that emotions and affections are the source of moral distinctions. In the standard interpretation of their texts, benevolence is the most fundamental moral virtue and benevolence is rooted in feelings r...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160010 |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Mencius and Francis Hutcheson are often interpreted as “moral sentimentalists” since they argue that emotions and affections are the source of moral
distinctions. In the standard interpretation of their texts, benevolence is the
most fundamental moral virtue and benevolence is rooted in feelings rather
than reason. Hutcheson’s philosophy constructs benevolence as the ultimate
principle of morality; an action can be called morally good only if it was
motivated by benevolence. In Mencius’ view, the heart-mind of the human
being has four sprouts that, if properly cultivated, will grow into four virtues.
The sentiment of compassion is the sprout that grows into benevolence.
Both philosophers therefore share the idea that benevolence (as a virtue)
comes from a natural sentiment in human beings, although this sentiment
must be properly cultivated in order to grow into full-fledged benevolence. |
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