A formal methodology for verifying side-channel vulnerabilities in cache architectures

Security-aware CPU caches have been designed to mitigate side-channel attacks and prevent information leakage. How to validate the effectiveness of these designs remains an unsolved problem. Prior works assess the security of architectures empirically without a formal guarantee, making the evaluatio...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jiang, Ke, Zhang, Tianwei, Sanan, David, Zhao, Yongwang, Liu, Yang
Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
Format: Conference or Workshop Item
Language:English
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/165417
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English