A formal methodology for verifying side-channel vulnerabilities in cache architectures
Security-aware CPU caches have been designed to mitigate side-channel attacks and prevent information leakage. How to validate the effectiveness of these designs remains an unsolved problem. Prior works assess the security of architectures empirically without a formal guarantee, making the evaluatio...
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Main Authors: | Jiang, Ke, Zhang, Tianwei, Sanan, David, Zhao, Yongwang, Liu, Yang |
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Other Authors: | School of Computer Science and Engineering |
Format: | Conference or Workshop Item |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2023
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/165417 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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