Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets

The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an efficient insurance market. The Indian and Chinese health insurance markets both suffer the varying effects of AS and MH, hindering the provision of inclusive and efficient insurance coverage to their re...

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Main Authors: Tan, Reena Hui Ying, Seah, Charlotte Ning, Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi)
Other Authors: Akshar Saxena
Format: Final Year Project
Language:English
Published: Nanyang Technological University 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1663002023-04-30T15:32:01Z Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets Tan, Reena Hui Ying Seah, Charlotte Ning Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi) Akshar Saxena School of Social Sciences aksharsaxena@ntu.edu.sg Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an efficient insurance market. The Indian and Chinese health insurance markets both suffer the varying effects of AS and MH, hindering the provision of inclusive and efficient insurance coverage to their respective citizens. In this paper, we aim to analyse how adverse selection occurs in different forms of health insurance schemes (public and private) and how types of insurance enrolment affect healthcare usage (measured using hospitalisation) across various prevalent diseases, with India and China as case studies. This paper uses copula regressions due to the strengths in accounting for endogenity, potential nonlinear relationships between variables, and goes beyond the usual assumption of bivariate normality in selection models. The results for India show significant probability of AS and MH across chronic and acute diseases analysed in the public health insurance (PHI) system but relative absence in the private insurance market. In China, it has been observed that AS is not present for chronic diseases across all insurance types, while MH is observed to be significant across all diseases for PHIs but absent for private health insurance. With these findings, we discuss possible reasons for the presence or absence of AS and MH, and recommend solutions. Particularly, nationwide campaigns may empower the community and generate positive attitudes towards managing chronic diseases, and preventive healthcare coverage is effective in reducing MH. There is potential for these recommendations to be replicated in India. Bachelor of Social Sciences in Economics and Public Policy and Global Affairs 2023-04-28T05:14:03Z 2023-04-28T05:14:03Z 2023 Final Year Project (FYP) Tan, R. H. Y., Seah, C. N. & Goh, Y. (. W. (2023). Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300 en HE1AY2223_26 application/pdf Nanyang Technological University
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics
spellingShingle Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics
Tan, Reena Hui Ying
Seah, Charlotte Ning
Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi)
Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
description The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an efficient insurance market. The Indian and Chinese health insurance markets both suffer the varying effects of AS and MH, hindering the provision of inclusive and efficient insurance coverage to their respective citizens. In this paper, we aim to analyse how adverse selection occurs in different forms of health insurance schemes (public and private) and how types of insurance enrolment affect healthcare usage (measured using hospitalisation) across various prevalent diseases, with India and China as case studies. This paper uses copula regressions due to the strengths in accounting for endogenity, potential nonlinear relationships between variables, and goes beyond the usual assumption of bivariate normality in selection models. The results for India show significant probability of AS and MH across chronic and acute diseases analysed in the public health insurance (PHI) system but relative absence in the private insurance market. In China, it has been observed that AS is not present for chronic diseases across all insurance types, while MH is observed to be significant across all diseases for PHIs but absent for private health insurance. With these findings, we discuss possible reasons for the presence or absence of AS and MH, and recommend solutions. Particularly, nationwide campaigns may empower the community and generate positive attitudes towards managing chronic diseases, and preventive healthcare coverage is effective in reducing MH. There is potential for these recommendations to be replicated in India.
author2 Akshar Saxena
author_facet Akshar Saxena
Tan, Reena Hui Ying
Seah, Charlotte Ning
Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi)
format Final Year Project
author Tan, Reena Hui Ying
Seah, Charlotte Ning
Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi)
author_sort Tan, Reena Hui Ying
title Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
title_short Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
title_full Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
title_fullStr Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
title_full_unstemmed Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
title_sort moral hazard and adverse selection in india's and china's health insurance markets
publisher Nanyang Technological University
publishDate 2023
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300
_version_ 1765213857360379904