Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets
The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an efficient insurance market. The Indian and Chinese health insurance markets both suffer the varying effects of AS and MH, hindering the provision of inclusive and efficient insurance coverage to their re...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | , , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Final Year Project |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Nanyang Technological University
2023
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
id |
sg-ntu-dr.10356-166300 |
---|---|
record_format |
dspace |
spelling |
sg-ntu-dr.10356-1663002023-04-30T15:32:01Z Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets Tan, Reena Hui Ying Seah, Charlotte Ning Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi) Akshar Saxena School of Social Sciences aksharsaxena@ntu.edu.sg Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an efficient insurance market. The Indian and Chinese health insurance markets both suffer the varying effects of AS and MH, hindering the provision of inclusive and efficient insurance coverage to their respective citizens. In this paper, we aim to analyse how adverse selection occurs in different forms of health insurance schemes (public and private) and how types of insurance enrolment affect healthcare usage (measured using hospitalisation) across various prevalent diseases, with India and China as case studies. This paper uses copula regressions due to the strengths in accounting for endogenity, potential nonlinear relationships between variables, and goes beyond the usual assumption of bivariate normality in selection models. The results for India show significant probability of AS and MH across chronic and acute diseases analysed in the public health insurance (PHI) system but relative absence in the private insurance market. In China, it has been observed that AS is not present for chronic diseases across all insurance types, while MH is observed to be significant across all diseases for PHIs but absent for private health insurance. With these findings, we discuss possible reasons for the presence or absence of AS and MH, and recommend solutions. Particularly, nationwide campaigns may empower the community and generate positive attitudes towards managing chronic diseases, and preventive healthcare coverage is effective in reducing MH. There is potential for these recommendations to be replicated in India. Bachelor of Social Sciences in Economics and Public Policy and Global Affairs 2023-04-28T05:14:03Z 2023-04-28T05:14:03Z 2023 Final Year Project (FYP) Tan, R. H. Y., Seah, C. N. & Goh, Y. (. W. (2023). Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300 en HE1AY2223_26 application/pdf Nanyang Technological University |
institution |
Nanyang Technological University |
building |
NTU Library |
continent |
Asia |
country |
Singapore Singapore |
content_provider |
NTU Library |
collection |
DR-NTU |
language |
English |
topic |
Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics |
spellingShingle |
Social sciences::Economic theory::Microeconomics Tan, Reena Hui Ying Seah, Charlotte Ning Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi) Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets |
description |
The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an efficient insurance market. The Indian and Chinese health insurance markets both suffer the varying effects of AS and MH, hindering the provision of inclusive and efficient insurance coverage to their respective citizens. In this paper, we aim to analyse how adverse selection occurs in different forms of health insurance schemes (public and private) and how types of insurance enrolment affect healthcare usage (measured using hospitalisation) across various prevalent diseases, with India and China as case studies. This paper uses copula regressions due to the strengths in accounting for endogenity, potential nonlinear relationships between variables, and goes beyond the usual assumption of bivariate normality in selection models. The results for India show significant probability of AS and MH across chronic and acute diseases analysed in the public health insurance (PHI) system but relative absence in the private insurance market. In China, it has been observed that AS is not present for chronic diseases across all insurance types, while MH is observed to be significant across all diseases for PHIs but absent for private health insurance. With these findings, we discuss possible reasons for the presence or absence of AS and MH, and recommend solutions. Particularly, nationwide campaigns may empower the community and generate positive attitudes towards managing chronic diseases, and preventive healthcare coverage is effective in reducing MH. There is potential for these recommendations to be replicated in India. |
author2 |
Akshar Saxena |
author_facet |
Akshar Saxena Tan, Reena Hui Ying Seah, Charlotte Ning Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi) |
format |
Final Year Project |
author |
Tan, Reena Hui Ying Seah, Charlotte Ning Goh, Yuki (Wu Weiqi) |
author_sort |
Tan, Reena Hui Ying |
title |
Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets |
title_short |
Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets |
title_full |
Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets |
title_fullStr |
Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets |
title_full_unstemmed |
Moral hazard and adverse selection in India's and China's health insurance markets |
title_sort |
moral hazard and adverse selection in india's and china's health insurance markets |
publisher |
Nanyang Technological University |
publishDate |
2023 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/166300 |
_version_ |
1765213857360379904 |