Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret ke...
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| Format: | Final Year Project |
| Language: | English |
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Nanyang Technological University
2023
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret key. I n this project, we explore the vulnerabilities of the MAX 10 FPGA to side-channel attacks (SCAs). Specifically, we focus on the Last Round Hamming Distance attack, which exploits the electromagnetic radiation emitted during the encryption process to infer information about the secret key. We successfully perform an SCA on the MAX 10 FPGA and recover the secret key, demonstrating the effectiveness of this attack on this device. |
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