Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA

With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret ke...

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Main Author: Teo, Yu Han
Other Authors: Gwee Bah Hwee
Format: Final Year Project
Language:English
Published: Nanyang Technological University 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1675222023-07-07T15:45:29Z Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA Teo, Yu Han Gwee Bah Hwee School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering ebhgwee@ntu.edu.sg Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret key. I n this project, we explore the vulnerabilities of the MAX 10 FPGA to side-channel attacks (SCAs). Specifically, we focus on the Last Round Hamming Distance attack, which exploits the electromagnetic radiation emitted during the encryption process to infer information about the secret key. We successfully perform an SCA on the MAX 10 FPGA and recover the secret key, demonstrating the effectiveness of this attack on this device. Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical and Electronic Engineering) 2023-05-29T07:19:49Z 2023-05-29T07:19:49Z 2023 Final Year Project (FYP) Teo, Y. H. (2023). Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
spellingShingle Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Teo, Yu Han
Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
description With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret key. I n this project, we explore the vulnerabilities of the MAX 10 FPGA to side-channel attacks (SCAs). Specifically, we focus on the Last Round Hamming Distance attack, which exploits the electromagnetic radiation emitted during the encryption process to infer information about the secret key. We successfully perform an SCA on the MAX 10 FPGA and recover the secret key, demonstrating the effectiveness of this attack on this device.
author2 Gwee Bah Hwee
author_facet Gwee Bah Hwee
Teo, Yu Han
format Final Year Project
author Teo, Yu Han
author_sort Teo, Yu Han
title Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
title_short Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
title_full Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
title_fullStr Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
title_full_unstemmed Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
title_sort electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel fpga
publisher Nanyang Technological University
publishDate 2023
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522
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