Language, perceived warmth, and investors' reactions to audit committee reports

An audit committee (AC) report is the primary channel through which investors learn about the responsibilities and activities of an AC. AC members may use personal language (“we”) or impersonal language (“the audit committee”) in an AC report. Psychology research suggests that personal (vs. imperson...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Tan, Hun-Tong, Xu, Tu, Yu, Yao
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/169161
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
Description
Summary:An audit committee (AC) report is the primary channel through which investors learn about the responsibilities and activities of an AC. AC members may use personal language (“we”) or impersonal language (“the audit committee”) in an AC report. Psychology research suggests that personal (vs. impersonal) language signals that the language user has greater warmth and sense of communion (i.e., being part of a larger group). Applying this theory, we predict that an AC's use of personal (vs. impersonal) language leads investors to perceive a warmer and more communal AC, and that an AC's perceived warmth/communion (cued by personal language) positively impacts investor judgments. We further posit that the positive effect of personal language is stronger when AC compensation is largely short term than long term. This is because investors need more assurance of AC oversight effectiveness when AC compensation is short term, which makes investors rely more on heuristic cues such as AC language to make judgments. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when AC compensation is largely short term, nonprofessional investors (proxied by Master of Business Administration students) react more positively to an AC's use of personal language than impersonal language. The effect of AC language is insignificant when AC compensation is largely long term, as the long-term compensation structure already provides assurance about the AC's oversight effectiveness, and thus, investors rely less on heuristic cues. Furthermore, we find that the perceived warmth of AC members explains the effect of AC language. Finally, our interviews with nonprofessional investors corroborate some of our main findings and validate their practice implications.