Incentive mechanism design for mitigating frontrunning and transaction reordering in decentralized exchanges
Decentralized exchanges (DEXes) provide effective price discovery and fair trading while dealing with the drawbacks of centralized exchanges, e.g., lack of transaction transparency and exclusive control of user assets and transaction fees. However, many DEXes suffer from frontrunning and transaction...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | Doe, Daniel Mawunyo, Li, Jing, Dusit, Niyato, Wang, Li, Han, Zhu |
---|---|
Other Authors: | School of Computer Science and Engineering |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2023
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/169633 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Promoting the sustainability of blockchain in web 3.0 and the metaverse through diversified incentive mechanism design
by: Doe, Daniel Mawunyo, et al.
Published: (2024) -
Price discovery on decentralized exchanges
by: CAPPONI, Agostino, et al.
Published: (2024) -
CrowdBC: A blockchain-based decentralized framework for crowdsourcing
by: LI, Ming, et al.
Published: (2019) -
EtherLearn: Decentralizing learning via blockchain
by: TA, Nguyen Binh Duong, et al.
Published: (2021) -
Historical analysis of decentralized applications
by: Ng, Teng Hian
Published: (2024)