Incentive mechanism design for mitigating frontrunning and transaction reordering in decentralized exchanges

• Main Authors: Doe, Daniel Mawunyo, Li, Jing, Dusit, Niyato, Wang, Li, Han, Zhu
• Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: 2023
• Subjects: Engineering::Computer science and engineering; Blockchain; Decentralized Exchanges
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/169633
• Institution: Nanyang Technological University

Decentralized exchanges (DEXes) provide effective price discovery and fair trading while dealing with the drawbacks of centralized exchanges, e.g., lack of transaction transparency and exclusive control of user assets and transaction fees. However, many DEXes suffer from frontrunning and transaction...