The effects of incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes on the propensity to report a questionable act
This paper examines whether incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes affect the propensity to report a questionable act in a hypothetical situation. Results from our experiment, which involved 258 accounting students, provide no evidence to support our hypothesis that when a close...
محفوظ في:
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , |
---|---|
مؤلفون آخرون: | |
التنسيق: | Final Year Project |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
2013
|
الموضوعات: | |
الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/51491 |
الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
|
الملخص: | This paper examines whether incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes affect the propensity to report a questionable act in a hypothetical situation. Results from our experiment, which involved 258 accounting students, provide no evidence to support our hypothesis that when a close relationship exists between the wrongdoer and decision-maker, a penalty scheme increases the propensity of whistle-blowing more than a reward scheme. Instead we found that reward scheme, but not penalty scheme, increases whistle-blowing when there is a close relationship. We also found no evidence to suggest that penalty scheme increases the whistle-blowing propensity of financially risk averse people more than that of financially risk taking people. |
---|