The effects of incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes on the propensity to report a questionable act

This paper examines whether incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes affect the propensity to report a questionable act in a hypothetical situation. Results from our experiment, which involved 258 accounting students, provide no evidence to support our hypothesis that when a close...

وصف كامل

محفوظ في:
التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Abdul Kareem, Salma Parveen, Pillai, Shamini, Ling, Violet Yee Ting
مؤلفون آخرون: Boo Hian Yong, El'fred
التنسيق: Final Year Project
اللغة:English
منشور في: 2013
الموضوعات:
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:http://hdl.handle.net/10356/51491
الوسوم: إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
الوصف
الملخص:This paper examines whether incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes affect the propensity to report a questionable act in a hypothetical situation. Results from our experiment, which involved 258 accounting students, provide no evidence to support our hypothesis that when a close relationship exists between the wrongdoer and decision-maker, a penalty scheme increases the propensity of whistle-blowing more than a reward scheme. Instead we found that reward scheme, but not penalty scheme, increases whistle-blowing when there is a close relationship. We also found no evidence to suggest that penalty scheme increases the whistle-blowing propensity of financially risk averse people more than that of financially risk taking people.