The effects of incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes on the propensity to report a questionable act
This paper examines whether incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes affect the propensity to report a questionable act in a hypothetical situation. Results from our experiment, which involved 258 accounting students, provide no evidence to support our hypothesis that when a close...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Final Year Project |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/51491 |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | This paper examines whether incentive schemes, working relationships and risk attitudes affect the propensity to report a questionable act in a hypothetical situation. Results from our experiment, which involved 258 accounting students, provide no evidence to support our hypothesis that when a close relationship exists between the wrongdoer and decision-maker, a penalty scheme increases the propensity of whistle-blowing more than a reward scheme. Instead we found that reward scheme, but not penalty scheme, increases whistle-blowing when there is a close relationship. We also found no evidence to suggest that penalty scheme increases the whistle-blowing propensity of financially risk averse people more than that of financially risk taking people. |
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